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it allows firms to coordinate to the high prices associated with separate purchase. (Pure)
bundling is more likely to be selected as a procurement strategy when: (i) the products’ values
are higher relative to their possible costs, (ii) costs for different goods are more negatively or
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1. Introduction
When purchasing multiple products from competing suppliers, what procurement strategy will
maximize a buyer’s (expected) surplus? This question arises in many economic situations. For
example, the buyer could be an individual who desires to have a kitchen and a bathroom reno-
vated, a company that desires to purchase some computers and printers, an airport in need of
an elevator and an escalator, or a government agency procuring a group of military equipment.
The buyer may solicit competitive bids for each product separately (separate purchase), pro-
cure the multiple products as a package through competitive bidding (pure bundling), or solicit
competitive bids simultaneously for individual products and for the package (mixed bundling).
This paper examines the buyer’s choice among these alternative procurement strategies.
Commodity bundling has been studied extensively from the perspective of a multiproduct
monopoly seller. Because consumer values are less dispersed for a bundle than for individ-
ual goods, pure bundling potentially allows the seller to extract more consumer surplus than
separate selling (e.g., Stigler, 1963; Schmalensee, 1984; Fang and Norman, 2006). Mixed
bundling, the practice of selling the products both separately and as a bundle, further endows
the seller with the ability to price discriminate; consequently, it always weakly—and some-
times strictly—dominates pure bundling and separate selling (e.g., Adam and Yellen, 1976;
Long, 1984; McAfee, McMillian, and Whinston, 1989; Chu, Leslie and Sorensen, 2011; Arm-
strong, 2013; Chen and Riordan, 2013). Surprisingly, there has been no parallel analysis on
the desirability of bundling from a monopsony buyer’s perspective. Such an analysis could
naturally connect the economics of bundled sales and bundled purchases, despite the apparent
difference that in the aforementioned literature on bundled sales there is usually no competition
among buyers,1 whereas in procurement the buyer can typically solicit competitive bids from
potential suppliers.2 As we shall demonstrate, while sharing some common intuition, bundling
achieves superiority through different mechanisms in these two different environments, and
1A seller with multiple objects may also auction the goods to competing buyers, possibly with bundling.
Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, and Moldovanu (2007) shows that the seller will receive higher revenues from mixed
bundling auctions than pure bundling and separate auctions.
2There have been studies of procurement that involve bundling, such as the analysis of split-award auctions
(e.g., Anton and Yao, 1989; 1992; Gong, Li and McAfee, 2012), and the comparison of separate tasks and
bundled tasks in a sequential procurement setting (Li et al., forthcoming). But the models and the interests in
these studies are very different from those in the aforementioned commodity bundling literature.
1
stronger results can be obtained, under general conditions, in the procurement context. Strik-
ingly, unlike for a monopoly seller, for a monopsony buyer mixed bundling is strictly dominated
by pure bundling whenever separate purchase is.
We consider a setting where a buyer has unit demand for each of two products, for which
her values are known to be vx and vy, respectively. Both products can be produced by two
competing firms. Each firm’s production costs for the two goods are random draws from some
joint probability distribution on support [0, c¯]2. We allow the two costs to have any dependence
relations except perfect positive dependence, and the joint cost distribution function can take
general forms. Firms know the cost realizations but the buyer does not. As in the literature on
bundled sales, we assume that the cost of producing two products jointly is equal to the sum
of their individual costs, so that there is no complementarity or economies of scope. For ease
of exposition, our main model will compare two procurement strategies: separate purchase vs.
pure bundling. The model is then extended to include the analysis of mixed bundling. When
it causes no confusion, we shall refer to pure bundling simply as bundling.
Our analysis of the main model starts with the base case where the buyer’s value for each
good is above its highest possible cost (i.e., vx, vy ≥ c¯), so that trade is always efficient. We
show in this case that buyer surplus is always higher under bundling than under separate
purchase. The reason for this result is closely related to the “dispersion reduction” idea under
bundled sales, but due to a different mechanism that we shall term as the “competition effect”:
firms’ costs are less dispersed for the package than for individual products, motivating them
to bid more aggressively for the two goods under bundling than under separate purchase,
resulting in lower prices.3 Notice that this result, invariant with the functional form of the
cost distribution, is stronger than its counterpart under bundled sales, where (pure) bundling
is sometimes less profitable than separate sales even when trade is always efficient (e.g., Fang
and Norman, 2006).
When trade for a good may not be efficient (i.e., at least one of vx and vy is lower than
c¯), bundling can reduce buyer surplus for two possible reasons that we shall jointly term as
3This is closely related to Dana (2012), where heterogenous consumers with different preferences towards
competing firms may form a buyer group that is indifferent between the firms, which eliminates product dif-
ferentiation and reduces equilibrium prices. By comparison, our model has no consumer heterogeneity, and
bundling boosts suppliers’ competition by reducing their cost asymmetry for the two goods.
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the “adverse tying” effect. First, both firms’ costs to supply the bundle may exceed the total
value of the bundle, even when their costs for one of the goods are lower than its value. This
is analogous to the inefficient tying that may occur under bundled sales. Second, both goods
will be purchased, but their total price could be lower under separate purchase, because when
the value of a good is lower than the maximum of two firms’ costs, it can force a lower price
bid on this good under separate purchase but not under bundling. This second adverse tying
effect is more subtle and arises for bundled procurement but not for bundled sales. We show
that the competition effect dominates the adverse tying effect, so that buyer surplus is higher
under bundling than under separate purchase, if trade for each good is likely to be efficient
(i.e., if each product value is likely to be higher than its cost); and the reverse is true if at least
one of the values is sufficiently low.
We further investigate how the bundling advantage, which we define as the change in buyer
surplus from separate to bundled purchase (and can thus be negative), may vary with product
values and properties of the cost distribution. The literature on bundled sales has focused on the
question of when bundling is more profitable than separate sales, leaving it largely unanswered
how large the bundling advantage is under general conditions. For bundled procurement, the
different structure of the problem enables us to gain more insight on this issue under general
cost distributions.
When a product value increases, buyer surplus under both separate and bundled purchases
will become higher, and hence the impact of the value increase on the bundling advantage is
a priori unclear. We show that when vx + vy < c¯, the bundling advantage decreases in the
value of one product if the other value is sufficiently low. This is because in this situation
there is likely to be adverse tying, the potential loss of which becomes higher as the product
value increases. On the other hand, when vx + vy ≥ c¯, the bundling advantage increases in
the value of one product if the other value is relatively high, because in this case as the value
increases the competition effect of bundling becomes more pronounced while the adverse tying
effect is either reduced or absent. (When vx, vy ≥ c¯, the bundling advantage is not affected by
a marginal increase in either of the product values.)
On the cost distribution, we consider its properties in two different dimensions: the de-
pendence relations between the two costs and the variance of each cost. For general cost
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distributions satisfying certain conditions, we prove that the buyer’s advantage from bundled
purchase is higher when the costs for two goods are more negatively or less positively depen-
dent.4 The effect of the cost variance is more subtle, because a higher variance of one cost will
cause more dispersion in the sum of the costs for two goods, and hence soften price competi-
tion under both separate and bundled purchases. For classes of joint cost distributions that are
formed by the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern (FGM) copula, we find that higher cost variance for
each product increases the bundling advantage.
We finally extend our analysis to include the procurement strategy of mixed bundling,
where the buyer solicits supply prices both for individual products and for the two goods as a
package. In contrast to bundled sales, for bundled purchase we find that mixed bundling can
actually generate lower buyer surplus than pure bundling. This is because the procurement
prices are determined through competitive bidding by the sellers. When sellers are invited to
bid on the price for the two goods as a package, the option for them to also bid on the prices
of individual goods changes their strategic interactions, enabling them to coordinate to higher
bids for the bundle so that the separate purchase equilibrium becomes an equilibrium outcome,
which would make the buyer worse off if she prefers the (pure) bundling outcome to that of
separate purchase.5 In fact, we find that the equilibrium outcome under separate purchase
can always be supported as an equilibrium outcome under mixed bundling, and it is also
the sellers’ Pareto-dominating outcome if there are multiple equilibria under mixed bundling.
Hence, mixed bundling is equivalent to separate purchase, provided that suppliers will play
their Pareto-dominating equilibrium in the presence of multiple equilibria. This justifies our
focus on the comparison of separate purchase with pure bundling.
In the rest of the paper, we formulate our model in section 2. In section 3, we compare
buyer surplus under bundling and separate purchase, and explore how the bundling advantage
varies with product values. Section 4 investigates how the bundling advantage changes with
cost dependence and variance. Mixed bundling is analyzed in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
4The literature on bundled sales has studied the parallel issue of how the profitability of bundling may
vary with the dependence of consumer values, but primarily under specific functional forms of consumer value
distributions (e.g., Schmalensee, 1984; Chen and Riordan, 2013).
5When competing sellers offer bundles to consumers, they may also collectively prefer pure bundling to mixed
bundling, but for strategic reasons different from ours. See, for example, Chen (1997), Armstrong and Vickers
(2010), and Zhou (2014).
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2. The Model
A buyer demands two products, X and Y , both of which can be produced by two competing
firms, i = 1, 2. The demanded quantity for each product is normalized to 1. A firm’s production
costs for X and Y are respectively cx and cy, which are realizations of two random variables
with joint distribution H(cx, cy) on [0, c¯]2, where 0 < c¯ ≤ ∞.6 The marginal distributions
of cx and cy are F (·) and G (·) , respectively. We assume that a firm’s cost of producing the
two products together is cx + cy, which rules out complementarity or economies of scope as
explanations for the potential advantage of bundled procurement. The cost realizations are
independent across firms.
The buyer values X and Y at vx > 0 and vy > 0, both of which are known constants and
will be treated as parameters of the model. The buyer’s objective is to maximize her expected
surplus, by choosing from the following two procurement strategies:
• Separate purchase (S). The buyer solicits simultaneous bids of separate supply prices for
X and for Y.
• Bundling (B). The buyer solicits bids of prices to supply X and Y as a package.7
Bids submitted by the firms are the prices at which they are willing to supply the products.
The buyer commits to choose the lower bid, and when two bids are the same, the bidder with
a lower cost is assumed to be selected (which can be justified by assuming that the lower-cost
supplier bids slightly lower), and each bidder has an equal chance to be selected if they have
the same cost.
The procurement game proceeds as follows: First, the buyer announces and commits to
the procurement strategy. Second, firm i learns its cost realization, (cxi , c
y
i ) , for i = 1, 2. Each
firm’s cost realization is known to both firms, but is unknown to the buyer.8 Third, firms
6We allow H (cx, cy) to be discontinuous, and thus the assumption that the two costs have common support
[0, c¯] is made without loss of generality.
7In section 5, we further allow the buyer to choose the procurement strategy of Mixed bundling (M), where
the buyer solicits supply prices both for individual products and for X and Y as a package.
8If vx and vy are above c¯, our results would be the same if we alternatively assume that a firm’s cost realization
is known only to itself. Then, the buyer could run the bidding as a second-price auction: the firm that bids a
lower price to supply a good or a package will win the bidding but be paid the highest bid price, instead of its
own bid; and bidding one’s true cost is a weakly dominant strategy for the firms.
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simultaneously submit bids corresponding to the procurement strategy chosen by the buyer.
Fourth, the buyer selects the winning bidder(s), and payments are made in exchange for the
delivery of goods. Following the convention in the literature (e.g., Anton and Yao, 1989), we
assume that a supplier will not bid a price that is below its production cost for the item.
We note that since (cx1 , c
y
1) and (c
x
2 , c
y
2) are independent and random draws, they follow
joint distribution H (cx1 , c
y
1)H (c
x
2 , c
y
2) .
The relationship between the costs will play an important role in our analysis. Following
Nelsen (2006), we have:
Definition 1 (i) cx and cy have perfect positive dependence when, for any two random draws
(cx1 , c
y
1) and (c
x
2 , c
y
2) , c
x
1 ≥ c
x
2 if and only if c
y
1 ≥ c
y
2. (ii) c
x and cy are not perfectly positively
dependent if, for any two random draws (cx1 , c
y
1) and (c
x
2 , c
y
2) , there is a positive probability that
cx1 > c
x
2 but c
y
1 < c
y
2.
Unless otherwise stated, we assume that cx and cy are not perfectly positively dependent.9
3. Analysis: Separate Purchase vs. Bundling
This section compares buyer surplus under separate purchase (S) and bundling (B). In many
situations, the buyer may consider both goods as “must–haves”, so that vx ≥ c¯ and vy ≥ c¯.
The analysis of this case is especially simple, and it serves as a useful benchmark. We thus
start with this base case, followed by a more general analysis with any product values.
3.1 Base Case: vx, vy ≥ c¯
First, under S, firms simultaneously submit bids for X and for Y. Given a pair of realized costs
(cx1 , c
y
1) and (c
x
2 , c
y
2) , the standard logic of Bertrand competition implies that the equilibrium
bids for good X and good Y by firm i, i = 1, 2, will be:
bxi = max {c
x
1 , c
x
2} , b
y
i = max {c
y
1, c
y
2} . (1)
9If cx and cy were perfectly positively dependent, bundling would have no strategic advantage relative to
separate purchase.
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Thus, the equilibrium total price for the two products under the specific cost realization is
tS = max {cx1 , c
x
2}+max {c
y
1, c
y
2} . (2)
The expected total procurement price for the buyer is:
T S = E[tS ] =
∫
[0,c¯]2
[max {cx1 , c
x
2}+max {c
y
1, c
y
2}] d [H (c
x
1 , c
y
1)H (c
x
2 , c
y
2)] . (3)
Next, under B, the suppliers simultaneously submit bids for X and Y as a package. Given
a pair of realized costs (cx1 , c
y
1) and (c
x
2 , c
y
2) , the standard logic of Bertrand competition implies
that the equilibrium bid for the package by firm i, i = 1, 2, will be:
bxyi = max {c
x
1 + c
y
1, c
x
2 + c
y
2} . (4)
Hence, the equilibrium price for the package given the cost realization is
tB = max {cx1 + c
y
2, c
x
2 + c
y
2} . (5)
The expected equilibrium price for the package is
TB = E[tB ] =
∫
[0,c¯]2
max {cx1 + c
y
2, c
x
2 + c
y
2} d [H (c
x
1 , c
y
1)H (c
x
2 , c
y
2)] . (6)
Denoting the buyer’s expected surplus under S and under B by W S and WB, respectively.
Since vx ≥ c¯ and vy ≥ c¯, we have
WB −W S =
[
vx + vy − T
B
]
−
[
vx + vy − T
S
]
= T S − TB. (7)
Hence, the buyer’s (expected) surplus is higher under B than under S if and only if the (ex-
pected) total procurement price for the two goods is lower under B. We have:
Proposition 1 Assume vx ≥ c¯ and vy ≥ c¯. Then W
B > W S . That is, the buyer achieves
higher expected surplus from bundling than from separate purchase.
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Proof. From (7), it suffices to show T S > TB. For every pair of cost realizations (cx1 , c
y
1) and
(cx2 , c
y
2), we have
tS = max{cx1 , c
x
2}+max{c
y
1, c
y
2}

> max{cx1 + c
y
1, c
x
2 + c
y
2} = t
B if cx1 ≥ c
x
2 but c
y
1 < c
y
2 or if c
x
1 < c
x
2 but c
y
1 ≥ c
y
2
= max{cx1 + c
y
1, c
x
2 + c
y
2} = t
B otherwise
.
Thus, tS ≥ tB, and
T S − TB
=
∫
cx
1
≥cx
2
,c
y
1
<c
y
2
;
cx
1
<cx
2
,c
y
1
≥cy
2
[max {cx1 , c
x
2}+max {c
y
1, c
y
2} −max {c
x
1 + c
y
1, c
x
2 + c
y
2}] d [H (c
x
1 , c
y
1)H (c
x
2 , c
y
2)]
> 0,
where the inequality holds because, by assumption, cx and cy are not perfectly positively
dependent.
Bundling reduces cost dispersion, making the firms’ costs for the two goods less asymmetric.
As a result, firms compete more aggressively to supply the two goods under bundling than under
separate purchase. When vx, vy ≥ c¯, the realized costs will always be lower than product values,
and hence the intensified competition under bundling will lead to lower expected total price
for the two goods, and hence also to higher buyer surplus.
If vx or vy is lower than c¯, it’s possible that the price for two goods is lower under separate
purchase, because a product value lower than the realized cost can force the firm to lower its
price under separate purchase. For example, suppose vx = 8, vy = 13, c
x
1 = 8 < c
x
2 = 12, and
cy1 = 12 > c
y
2 = 10. Then the equilibrium price for two goods is 21 under bundling but is 20
under separate purchase. The next subsection analyses this general case.
3.2 General Analysis with Any Product Values
We now consider the general case where vx and vy may be lower than c¯, to compare broadly
the buyer’s surplus under S and B, and to explore how the buyer’s potential advantage from
bundling may vary with her valuations for the products. For convenience, this section assumes
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the costs admit joint density h (cx, cy) > 0 on [0, c¯]2 . Define
zx ≡ max {c
x
1 , c
x
2} ; zy ≡ max {c
y
1, c
y
2} . (8)
Then, (zx, zy) is the first order statistic of the sample {(c
x
1 , c
y
1) , (c
x
2 , c
y
2)} , and the joint distri-
bution of (zx, zy) is
H(1) (zx, zy) = Pr (c
x
1 ≤ zx, c
y
1 ≤ zy) Pr (c
x
2 ≤ zx, c
y
2 ≤ zy)
= [H (zx, zy)]
2 , for (zx, zy) ∈ [0, c¯] .
The marginal distributions of zx and zy are
F(1) (zx) = [F (zx)]
2 , G(1) (zy) = [G (zy)]
2 . (9)
Define σ ≡ cx + cy, which has cdf
L (σ) = Pr (cx + cy ≤ σ) =
∫ σ
0
∫ c¯
0
h (cx, t− cx) dcxdt (10)
on [0, 2c¯] . Then,
z ≡ max {cx1 + c
y
1, c
x
2 + c
y
2} (11)
has cdf L2 (z) on [0, 2c¯] .
Under S, given a pair of realized costs (cx1 , c
y
1) and (c
x
2 , c
y
2) , for i = 1, 2; j 6= i, since vx and
vy may be lower than ci now, the equilibrium bids of firm i become:
bxi = max
{
cxi ,min
{
vx, c
x
j
}}
, byi = max
{
cyi ,min
{
vy, c
y
j
}}
. (12)
It follows that the equilibrium prices for X and Y are respectively:
bx = min {max {vx,min {c
x
1 , c
x
2}} , zx} , b
y = min {max {vy,min {c
y
1, c
y
2}} , zy} , (13)
and hence we have the result below:
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Lemma 1 (Separate Purchase Outcome.) For cost realizations (cx1 , c
y
1) and (c
x
2 , c
y
2), the
equilibrium outcome under separate purchase is: (i) if vk ≥ min{c
k
1 , c
k
2} for k = x, y, the firm
with the lower production cost for k supplies product k at price equal to min{vk, zk}; (ii) if
vk < min{c
k
1 , c
k
2} for k = x, y, the buyer does not purchase product k.
If the realized zx ≤ vx, then zx is the equilibrium bid price for supplying good X, in which
case the buyer’s surplus from purchasing X is vx−zx. If zx > vx, then the equilibrium bid price
will be max {vx,min {c
x
1 , c
x
2}} , in which case the buyer’s surplus from purchasing X is zero.
Therefore, the buyer can have a positive surplus from purchasing X only if vx > zx. Similarly,
the buyer can have a positive surplus from purchasing Y only if vy > zy. It follows that the
buyer’s expected surplus under S is
W S =
∫ vx
0
(vx − zx) dF
2 (zx) +
∫ vy
0
(vy − zy) dG
2 (zy)
=
∫ vx
0
F 2 (zx) dzx +
∫ vy
0
G2 (zy) dzy. (14)
Under B, given a pair of realized costs (cx1 , c
y
1) and (c
x
2 , c
y
2) , for i = 1, 2; j 6= i, the equilibrium
bid of firm i now becomes:
bxyi = max
{
cxi + c
y
i ,min
{
vx + vy, c
x
j + c
y
j
}}
. (15)
We thus immediately have the following:
Lemma 2 (Bundling Outcome) For cost realizations (cx1 , c
y
1) and (c
x
2 , c
y
2), the equilibrium
outcome under bundling is: (i) if vx + vy ≥ min{c
x
1 + c
y
1, c
x
2 + c
y
2}, the firm with the lower
production cost for the package supplies both products at price equal to min{vx + vy, z}; (ii) if
vx + vy < min{c
x
1 + c
y
1, c
x
2 + c
y
2}, the buyer does not purchase the package.
By the same logic as under S, the buyer’s expected surplus under B is
WB =
∫ vx+vy
0
(vx + vy − z) dL
2 (z) =
∫ vx+vy
0
L2 (z) dz. (16)
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Therefore:
∂W S
∂vx
=


F 2 (vx) if vx ≤ c¯
1 if vx > c¯
;
∂W S
∂vy
=


G2 (vy) if vy ≤ c¯
1 if vy > c¯
, (17)
∂WB
∂vx
=
∂WB
∂vx
=


L2 (vx + vy) if vx + vy ≤ 2c¯
1 if vx + vy > 2c¯
. (18)
Define the bundling advantage as the change in the buyer’s expected surplus from S to B:
∆W = WB −W S. (19)
We next state our general result concerning when bundled procurement may yield higher
or lower surplus to the buyer than separate purchase, and how the bundling advantage may
vary with her valuations for the products.
Theorem 1 (i) There exist µ1 and µ2, with 0 < µ1 ≤ µ2 < c¯, such that W
B > W S if
vx, vy > µ2 but W
B < W S if vx < µ1 or vy < µ1. (ii) For k = x, y 6= l, when vx + vy < c¯, ∆W
decreases in vk if vl ≤ δ1 for some sufficiently small δ1 > 0; when vx + vy ≥ c¯, ∆W increases
in vk if vk < c¯ and vl ≥ δ2 for some δ2 (< c¯) sufficiently close to c¯.
Part (i) of Theorem 1 states that, as long as both product values are not much below
c¯, the buyer’s surplus is higher under bundling than under separate purchase; however, if at
least one of the values is low enough, then the buyer is better off with separate purchase.
This generalizes the result in Proposition 1, which covers the case of both product values
being above c¯ (so that the buyer always purchases both products). In that base case, the
buyer always prefers B to S, because bundling reduces the cost asymmetry between sellers and
intensifies their competition, which leads to lower price. When product values are smaller than
c¯, bundling no longer necessarily leads to lower prices than separate purchase, and the buyer
may be better off to purchase only one product when the other product’s realized cost exceeds
its value. Thus, bundling involves a trade off between the gain from intensified competition
and the loss from potential adverse tying. We find that the competition effect dominates
when values are relatively high (but both can be lower than c¯), while the adverse tying effect
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dominates when at least one value is sufficiently low.
Part (ii) of Theorem 1 shows how the bundling advantage, ∆W, may vary with product
values. When vx+vy < c¯, if one value is sufficiently low, then ∆W decreases as the other value
rises, because the potential loss from adverse tying becomes more severe. When vx + vy ≥ c¯,
∆W increases in a value when the other value is relatively high, because in this case as the
value increases, the adverse tying effect is either reduced or absent, whereas the competition
advantage under bundling increases. Notice that when both vx ≥ c¯ and vy ≥ c¯, a marginal
increase in vx or vy will have no impact on ∆W.
The proof strategy for Theorem 1 is as follows. While WB and W S are difficult to compare
directly, it turns out that their rates of change (i.e., partial derivatives) with respect to vx or
vy can be compared relatively easily. We thus first examine how ∆W ≡ W
B −W S may vary
with vx and vy. We then compare W
B and W S by using the facts that ∆W |vx=vy=0 = 0 and,
from Proposition 1, ∆W |vx,vy≥c¯ > 0.
Specifically, we prove Theorem 1 by establishing two claims below. Claim 1 considers the
case of vx + vy < c¯, where we show that ∆W decreases in vk when vl is sufficiently small,
and hence, starting from vx = vy = 0, ∆W is initially negative. The case of vx + vy ≥ c¯ is
considered in Claim 2.
Claim 1 Suppose that vx + vy < c¯. Then, for k = x, y 6= l and for any given vk,
∂∆W
∂vk
< 0 if
vl ≤ δ1 for some sufficiently small δ1 > 0. Furthermore, there exists some µ1 ∈ (0, c¯) such that
∆W < 0 when vx, vy ≤ µ1.
Proof. When vx + vy < c¯,
L (vx + vy) = Pr (c
x + cy ≤ vx + vy) = F (vx)−
∫ vx
0
∫ c¯
vx+vy−cx
dH (cx, cy)+
∫ vy
0
∫ vx+vy−cy
vx
dH (cx, cy) .
Thus, from (17) and (18),
∂∆W
∂vx
= L2 (vx + vy)− F
2 (vx) = [L (vx + vy) + F (vx)] [L (vx + vy)− F (vx)] .
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For any given vx < c¯, since
L (vx + vy)− F (vx)
=
∫ vy
0
∫ vx+vy−cy
vx
h (cx, cy) dcxdcy −
∫ vx
0
∫ c¯
vx+vy−cx
h (cx, cy) dcxdcy
→ −
∫ vx
0
∫ c¯
vx−cx
h (cx, cy) dcxdcy < 0 as vy → 0,
∂∆W
∂vx
< 0 when vy is sufficiently small.
Similarly, for any given vy < c¯, when vx is sufficiently small,
∂∆W
∂vy
= [L (vx + vy) +G (vy)] [L (vx + vy)−G (vy)] < 0.
Thus, for k = x, y 6= l and for any given vk < c¯, there exists some small δ1 > 0 such that
∂∆W
∂vk
< 0 if vl ≤ δ1. It follows that there is some small ε > 0 such that when vx, vy ≤ ε,
∂∆W
∂vx
< 0 and ∂∆W
∂vy
< 0. Furthermore, since ∆W = 0 if vx = vy = 0, for ∆vx ≤ ε and ∆vy ≤ ε:
∆W =
∂∆W
∂vx
∆vx +
∂∆W
∂vy
∆vy < 0.
Therefore, there exists some µ1, with c¯ > µ1 > δ1 > 0, such that ∆W = W
B −W S < 0 when
vx, vy ≤ µ1.
Next, suppose that vx+vy ≥ c¯. We show that if vl is not much below c¯, then ∂∆W/∂vk > 0
for any vk < c¯. Furthermore, since ∆W > 0 when vx, vy ≥ c¯ and since ∆W is continuos in vx
and vy, we have ∆W > 0 when vx, vy ≥ µ2 for some µ2 < c¯.
Claim 2 Suppose that vx + vy ≥ c¯. For k = x, y 6= l and for any given vk < c¯,
∂∆W
∂vk
> 0 if
vl ≥ δ2 for some δ2 (< c¯) sufficiently close to c¯. Furthermore, there exists some µ2 ∈ [µ1, c¯)
such that ∆W > 0 when vx, vy > µ2.
Proof. First, at any given vx < c¯, if vx + vy ≥ 2c¯, then
∂∆W
∂vx
= 1− F 2 (vx) > 0.
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Next, suppose vx + vy < 2c¯. Then
L (vx + vy) = F (vx)−
∫ vx
vx+min{vy ,c¯}−c¯
∫ c¯
vx+vy−cx
h (cx, cy) dcydcx+
∫ c¯
vx
∫ vx+vy−cx
0
h (cx, cy) dcydcx.
Thus, if vy ≥ c¯ or if vy < c¯ but vy → c¯,
L (vx + vy)−F (vx) =
∫ c¯
vx
∫ vx+vy−cx
0
h (cx, cy) dcydcx−
∫ vx
vx+min{vy,c¯}−c¯
∫ c¯
vx+vy−cx
h (cx, cy) dcydcx > 0.
Hence, at any given vx < c¯, if vy ≥ δ2 for some δ2 (< c¯) sufficiently close to c¯,
∂∆W
∂vx
= [L (vx + vy) + F (vx)] [L (vx + vy)− F (vx)] > 0.
Similarly, for any given vy < c¯, if vx ≥ δ2 for some δ2 (< c¯) sufficiently close to c¯,
∂∆W
∂vy
= [L (vx + vy) +G (vy)] [L (vx + vy)−G (vy)] > 0.
Finally, from Proposition 1, when vx, vy ≥ c¯, ∆W is strictly positive for given H (·, ·) .
Therefore, since ∆W is continuous in vx and vy, there exists some µ2 ∈ [µ1, c¯) such that
∆W > 0 when vx, vy > µ2.
We note that Theorem 1 follows immediately from Claim 1 and Claim 2.
From Theorem 1, the bundling advantage (∆W ) is negative when product values are below
µ1 and positive when product values are above µ2. Furthermore, there will be some δ1 ≤ δ2
such that for k = x, y, ∂∆W
∂vk
< 0 when vx, vy < δ1 and
∂∆W
∂vk
> 0 when vx, vy > δ2. When
vx = vy ≡ v, it is possible that µ1 = µ2 and δ1 = δ2 so that ∆W first monotonically decreases
and then monotonically increases in v (until v = c¯), as we illustrate in the two examples below
where the two costs are independently distributed with the same marginal distribution.
Example 1 Suppose that h (cx, cy) = f (cx) g (cy) = 1
a2
for (cx, cy) ∈ [0, a]2 , and vx = vy ≡
v ≤ a. Then,
L (σ) =


∫ σ
0
(∫ σ−x
0
1
a2
dy
)
dx = 12
σ2
a2
if 0 ≤ σ ≤ a∫ σ−a
0
∫ a
0
1
a2
dydx+
∫ a
σ−a
(∫ σ−x
0
1
a2
dy
)
dx = 12
4aσ−2a2−σ2
a2
if a ≤ σ ≤ 2a
.
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W S = 2
∫ v
0
z2x
a2
dzx =
2
3
v3
a2
,
WB =
∫ 2v
0
(2v − z) dL2 (z)
=


∫ 2v
0 (2v − z)
z3
a4
dz if 0 ≤ 2v ≤ a∫ a
0 (2v − z)
z3
a4
dz +
∫ 2v
a
(2v − z)
(
− (2a− z) −4az+2a
2+z2
a4
)
dz if a ≤ 2v ≤ 2a
=


8
5
v5
a4
if 0 ≤ 2v ≤ a
− 130
240av4−60a4v−400a2v3+240a3v2+5a5−48v5
a4
if a ≤ 2v ≤ 2a
.
Thus
∆W = WB −W S =


− 215v
3 5a2−12v2
a4
if 0 ≤ 2v ≤ a
− 130
240av4−60a4v−380a2v3+240a3v2+5a5−48v5
a4
if a ≤ 2v ≤ 2a
,
where − 215v
3 5a2−12v2
a4
< 0 for v ≤ a/2; and for v ≥ a/2, it is apparent from numerical analysis
that
−
1
30
240av4 − 60a4v − 380a2v3 + 240a3v2 + 5a5 − 48v5
a4
≶ 0 if v ≶ 0.6828a.
Therefore, ∆W ≶ 0 when v ≶ 0.6828a = µ1 = µ2. We also note that ∂∆W∂v ≶ 0 when v ≶ a/2 =
δ1 = δ2, because
∂∆W
∂v
=


−2v2 (a− 2v) a+2v
a4
< 0 if 0 ≤ 2v ≤ a
2 (a− v) (a− 2v) −5av+a
2+2v2
a4
> 0 if a ≤ 2v ≤ 2a
.
In Example 1, since c¯ = a, δ1 = δ2 = 0.5c¯, µ1 = µ2 = 0.6828c¯, and ∆W first monotonically
decreases and then monotonically increases in v until v = c¯.
Example 2 Suppose that F (c) = G (c) = 1 − e−λc and h (cx, cy) =
(
λe−λc
x) (
λe−λc
y)
, for
(cx, cy) ∈ [0,∞)2, λ > 0, and vx, vy > 0. Then,
W S = 2
∫ v
0
(
1− e−λzx
)2
dzx =
1
λ
[
−e2(−λv) + 4e−λv + 2λv − 3
]
,
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l (σ) =
∫ σ
0
f(t)g(σ − t)dt = λ
(
σλe−σλ
)
,
L (σ; θ) =
∫ σ
0
λ
(
tλe−tλ
)
dt = 1− e−σλ − σλe−σλ,
WB =
∫ 2v
0
(
1− e−zλ − zλe−zλ
)2
dz
=
16e−2vλ − 5e−4vλ + 8vλ− 8v2λ2e−4vλ + 16vλe−2vλ − 12vλe−4vλ − 11
4λ
.
∆W =
−16e−vλ + 20e−2vλ − 5e−4vλ − 8v2λ2e−4vλ + 16vλe−2vλ − 12vλe−4vλ + 1
4λ
≶ 0 if v ≶
2. 363 1
λ
.
∂ (∆W )
∂v
= 2e−vλ
(
e−vλ + e2(−vλ) + 2vλe2(−vλ) − 2
)(
e−vλ + 2vλe−vλ − 1
)
≶ 0 if v ≶
1. 256 4
λ
.
In Example 2, the expected cost for each product is E (cx) = E (cy) = 1
λ
, δ1 = δ2 =
1. 256 4
λ
,
and µ1 = µ2 =
2. 363 1
λ
. As v rises, ∆W monotonically decreases for v < δ1 = δ2 and then
monotonically increases, and ∆W < 0 for v < µ1 = µ2 but ∆W > 0 for v >
2. 363 1
λ
.
We summarize how the bundling advantage ∆W varies with product value when the buyer
has the same value v for the two goods in the following:
Corollary 2 Suppose the buyer has the same value v for the two goods. Then ∆W initially
decreases and eventually increases in v until it becomes independent of v for v > c¯.
4. Cost Distribution and Bundling Advantage
In this section, we turn our attention to the role of costs. We are interested in how two key
properties of the cost distribution, the variance of cx or cy and their dependence relation, affect
the buyer’s advantage from bundled procurement over separate purchase. To isolate the cost
effect, in this section we shall assume that vx ≥ c¯ and vy ≥ c¯. The comparison of W
B and
W S will then be determined by the comparison of the expected procurement prices, TB and
T S . Thus, in this section we shall write ∆W = WB −W S = T S − TB , which is positive from
Proposition 1.
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We first establish a general result about how cost dependence impacts ∆W under an as-
sumption connecting cost dependence with cost dispersion. We then consider specific classes
of cost distributions to illustrate the result and to also explore how cost variance impacts ∆W.
4.1 The Impact of Cost Dependence
Following the standard definition in the literature (e.g., Nelsen, 2006), the two costs are posi-
tively (quadrant) dependent if H (cx, cy) > F (cx)G (cy) , and negatively (quadrant) dependent
if H (cx, cy) < F (cx)G (cy) . Roughly speaking, the costs are positively dependent if a higher
(or lower) cx is more likely to occur with a higher (or lower) cy, whereas they are negatively
dependent if a higher (or lower) cx is more likely to occur with a lower (or higher) cy.10 More-
over, for two joint distributions H˜ (cx, cy) and H (cx, cy) with common marginal distributions
F and G, if H˜ (cx, cy) ≥ H (cx, cy) for all (cx, cy) ∈ [0, c¯]2 , then H˜ (cx, cy) is less negatively or
more positively dependent than H (cx, cy) , in which case we shall simply say that H˜ (cx, cy) is
more dependent than H (cx, cy) .
Recall from (3) and (6) that the expected procurement prices for the two goods under S
and B are respectively
T S =
∫ c¯
0
zxd
[
F 2 (zx)
]
+
∫ c¯
0
zyd
[
G2 (zy)
]
; TB =
∫ 2c¯
0
zd
[
L2 (z)
]
,
where zx = max {c
x
1 , c
x
2} , zy = max {c
y
1, c
y
2} , and z = max {c
x
1 + c
y
1, c
x
2 + c
y
2} .
When cx and cy are more dependent, low values of cx are more likely to occur together with
low values of cy, and high values of cx are more likely to occur together with high values of cy.
This suggests that, as the two costs become more dependent, L (σ) = Pr (cx + cy ≤ σ) is likely
to increase below some σ = σˆ ∈ (0, 2c¯) but decrease above σˆ. Thus, two distribution functions
L˜ (σ) =
∫ ∫
cx+cy≤σ
dH˜ (cx, cy) ; L (σ) =
∫ ∫
cx+cy≤σ
dH (cx, cy) , (20)
10There are plausible situations where costs for the two goods are negatively or positively dependent. For
example, when a supplier faces a rigid constraint on some critical resource, devoting more of it to reducing
the cost of one product is likely to raise the other product’s cost, in which case the costs would be negatively
dependent. On the other hand, when two products utilize some common input, their costs can be positively
dependent, rising or falling together with the input price.
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where H˜ (cx, cy) and H (cx, cy) have the common marginal distributions F and G, are likely to
satisfy the following assumption:
A1. L˜ (σ) is a rotation of L (σ) with rotation point σˆ, in the sense that L˜ (σ) R L (σ) if σ ⋚ σˆ,
if H˜ (cx, cy) is more dependent than H (cx, cy) .
As discussed in the literature (e.g., Johnson and Myatt, 2006; Chen and Zhang, 2014), when
L˜ (σ) is a rotation of L (σ), L˜ (σ) is more dispersed than L (σ) .11 Thus, when assumption A1
holds, the distribution of the sum of the two costs is more dispersed if they are more dependent.
Proposition 2 Assume that A1 holds and σˆ is sufficiently small. Then the bundling advan-
tage, ∆W, is lower if cx and cy are more dependent.
Proof. Consider any two joint distributions H˜ (cx, cy) and H (cx, cy) under common margins
F and G, with H˜ (cx, cy) being more dependent than H (cx, cy) . Denote the corresponding
bundling advantages by ∆W˜ = T˜ S − T˜B and ∆W = T S − TB. We show that ∆W˜− ∆W =(
T˜ S − T s
)
+
(
TB − T˜B
)
< 0.
Since the marginal distributions are the same under the two joint distributions, we have
T˜ S = T S. Therefore,
∆W˜ −∆W = TB − T˜B =
∫ 2c¯
0
zd
[
L2 (z)− L˜2 (z)
]
= z
[
L2 (z)− L˜2 (z)
]∣∣∣2c¯
0
−
∫ 2c¯
0
[
L2 (z)− L˜2 (z)
]
dz
=
∫ σˆ
0
[
L˜2 (z)− L2 (z)
]
dz −
∫ 2c¯
σˆ
[
L2 (z)− L˜2 (z)
]
dz < 0,
because
∫ σˆ
0
[
L˜2 (z)− L2 (z)
]
dz is close to zero when σˆ is sufficiently small and 0 < L˜ (z) < L (z)
for σˆ < z < 2c¯.
Therefore, under the conditions of Proposition 2, the bundling advantage is higher if the
costs of the two products are more negatively or less positively dependent.
11Rotation is a less stringent way of ranking the disperson of two distributions than some other concepts such
as the second-order stochastic dominance. As we shall illustrate in the next subsection, the rotation concept
will enable us to compare the dispersion of L˜ (σ) and L (σ) associted with some familiar cost distributions that
cannot be ranked, for example, by stochasitic dominance.
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To illustrate Proposition 2 and to further gain insights on the effects of cost variance, we
next consider classes of joint cost distributions formed by the FGM copula.
4.2 Effects of Cost Dependence and Variance under FGM Copulas
A copula is a bivariate uniform distribution that “couples” arbitrary marginal distributions to
form a new joint distribution. By Sklar’s Theorem, it is without loss of generality to represent
the joint distribution of two variables by a copula and the marginal distributions (Nelsen,
2006). Specifically, we consider classes of joint distributions formed by the FGM copula family,
with the marginal distribution functions being either uniform or exponential. In addition to
illustrating how the dependence of costs may matter for the bundling advantage, we are also
interested in the role played by the dispersion of each cost’s marginal distribution, measured
by its variance. This copula approach to representing the joint cost distributions enables us to
disentangle the effect of each individual cost from the effect of the dependence relation between
the two costs.12
The joint cost distributions formed by the family of FGM copulas under marginal distribu-
tion functions F and G can be written as
H (cx, cy; θ) = F (cx)G(cy) [1 + θ(1− F (cx))(1 −G(cy))] , (21)
with joint density
h(cx, cy; θ) = f(cx)g(cy) [1 + θ (2G (cy)− 1) (2F (cx)− 1)] . (22)
Here, parameter θ ∈ [−1, 1] is a measure of the dependence relationship between cx and cy.
The two costs are negatively dependent if θ < 0, independent if θ = 0, and positively dependent
if θ > 0. Furthermore, as θ increases, the two costs become more dependent.
Suppose first that each cost, cx or cy, is uniformly distributed on [0, a]. Then, since
Var(cx) = Var(cy) = 112a
2, a is a measure of the dispersion of the marginal distribution.
12For an introduction to copulas in statistic analysis, see Nelsen (2006). Copulas have been a useful tool to
model consumer preferences for multiple products. See, for example, Chen and Riordan (2013) for a discussion
of some recent applications. The FGM copula is frequently used in applications.
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The joint density of (cx, cy) then becomes
h(cx, cy; θ) =
1
a2
[
1 + θ
(
2cy
a
− 1
)(
2cx
a
− 1
)]
. (23)
With 0 ≤ zx, zy ≤ a, we have
T S =
∫
zxd [F (zx)]
2 +
∫
zyd [G (zy)]
2 =
∫ a
0
zx2
zx
a2
dzx +
∫ a
0
zy2
zy
a2
dzy =
4
3
a.
Next, the distribution of σ = cx + cy is:
L (σ; θ) =


∫ σ
0
(∫ σ−x
0
1
a2
(
1 + θ
(
2y
a
− 1
) (
2x
a
− 1
))
dy
)
dx
∫ σ−a
0
∫ a
0
(1+θ( 2ya −1)(
2x
a
−1))
a2
dydx+
∫ a
σ−a
(∫ σ−x
0
(1+θ( 2ya −1)(
2x
a
−1))
a2
dy
)
dx
=


1
6σ
2 θ(a−σ)(3a−σ)+3a
2
a4
if 0 ≤ σ ≤ a
1
6
12a3σ−3a2σ2−6a4+θ(a−σ)(a+σ)(2a−σ)2
a4
if a ≤ σ ≤ 2a
.
Notice that A1 is satisfied here because, when θ2 > θ1 so that H (·; θ2) is more dependent than
H (·; θ1) , L (σ; θ2) is a rotation of L (σ; θ1) with rotation point σˆ = a. Notice also that σˆ need
not be small for Proposition 2 to hold.
Thus,
d(L(z)2)
dz
=


1
9z
3
(
3a2θ + z2θ + 3a2 − 4azθ
)
3a2θ+2z2θ+3a2−6azθ
a8
if 0 ≤ z ≤ a
1
9 (z − 2a)
(
a2θ − 2z2θ − 3a2 + 2azθ
)
12a3z+4a4θ−z4θ−3a2z2−6a4−3a2z2θ+4az3θ−4a3zθ
a8
if a ≤ z ≤ 2a
,
and
TB =
∫ 2a
0
zd
(
L (z)2
)
=
1
5670
a
(
234θ − 17θ2 + 6993
)
.
Therefore,
T S − TB =
1
5670
a
(
−234θ + 17θ2 + 567
)
,
which monotonically increases in a and monotonically decreases in θ for θ ∈ [−1, 1] . That is,
∆W = T S−TB is larger when the two costs are less dependent or when each cost has a higher
variance.
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Suppose next that cx and cy both follow the exponential distribution F (c) = G (c) =
1 − e−λc. Then, since Var(cx) = Var(cy) = 1
λ2
, a higher 1
λ
implies that each cost is more
dispersed. We have:
T S = 2
∫
zxd [F (zx)]
2 = 2λ
∫ ∞
0
z2
(
1− e−λz
)
e−λzdz =
3
λ
,
l (σ; θ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
h (cx, σ − cx) dcx =
∫ σ
0
f(t)g(σ − t) [1 + θ (2G (σ − t)− 1) (2F (t)− 1)] dt
=
∫ σ
0
λe−λtλe−λ(σ−t)
(
1 + θ
(
2
(
1− e−λ(σ−t)
)
− 1
)(
2
(
1− e−λt
)
− 1
))
dt
= λ
(
−4θe−σλ + 4θe−2σλ + σλe−σλ + σθλe−σλ + 4σθλe−2σλ
)
,
L (σ; θ) =
∫ σ
0
λ
(
−4θe−tλ + 4θe−2tλ + tλe−tλ + tθλe−tλ + 4tθλe−2tλ
)
dt
= 1− e−σλ − 3θe2(−σλ) + 3θe−σλ − σλe−σλ − 2σθλe2(−σλ) − σθλe−σλ.
It follows that
∂L (σ; θ)
∂θ
= −e−σλ
(
3e−σλ + σλ+ 2σλe−σλ − 3
)
,
which is positive for σ < 2.1491
λ
but negative for σ > 2.1491
λ
. Hence, for θ2 > θ1, L (σ; θ2) is a
rotation of L (σ; θ1) with rotation point σˆ (λ) =
2.1491
λ
. Thus assumption A1 is satisfied, and
the rotation point σˆ can be quite large. Moreover,
TB =
∫ ∞
0
zd
(
L (z)2
)
dz
=
∫ ∞
0
z

 −2e−zλλ
(
e−zλ + 3θe2(−zλ) − 3θe−zλ + zλe−zλ + 2zθλe2(−zλ) + zθλe−zλ − 1
)
·
(
−4θ + zλ+ 4θe−zλ + zθλ+ 4zθλe−zλ
)

 dz
=
1
216
20θ − θ2 + 594
λ
.
Therefore
T S − TB =
3
λ
−
1
216
20θ − θ2 + 594
λ
=
1
216
−20θ + θ2 + 54
λ
,
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which decreases in θ but increases in 1/λ. That is, ∆W = T S − TB is smaller when the two
costs are more dependent but larger when each cost has a higher variance.13
Summarizing the discussion above, we have:
Proposition 3 Assume that the joint distribution of (cx, cy) is formed by the class of FGM
copulas defined in (21), with the marginal distributions being either (i) uniform on [0, a] , with
variance 112a
2, or (ii) exponential, with mean 1
λ
and variance 1
λ2
. Then, ∆W always decreases
in θ, whereas in case (i) it increases in a and in case (ii) it increases in 1
λ
. That is, the bundling
advantage is higher when the costs of the two products are less dependent or when the variance
of each cost is higher.
When cx and cy are more dependent, the distribution of cx+cy is more dispersed, and hence
the costs of the bundle are likely to be more asymmetric for the two firms, which softens their
competition under bundled procurement. On the other hand, the competitive bidding under
separate purchase is not affected by the dependence between the two costs. Therefore more
dependence between the two costs reduces the bundling advantage, even though from Propo-
sition 1 the buyer always prefers bundling to separate purchase when vx, vy ≥ c¯. The classes of
distributions considered in this subsection also illustrate the plausibility of the conditions for
Proposition 2.
When the marginal distributions of costs have a higher variance, the cost of each good is
more dispersed, but the cost dispersion of the bundle may also be higher, so that the competitive
bidding under separate and bundled purchases may both be less intense. Thus, a prior i, it is not
clear how an increase in the variance of each cost may impact the bundling advantage. For the
classes of distributions formed by the FGM copula family with uniform and with exponential
margins, we find that the bundling advantage increases in the variance of each cost, suggesting
that the dispersion of costs is less affected under bundling than under separate purchase by the
higher variance.
13Notice that in this case, when vx = vy ≥ 10/λ, F (vx) = G (vy) > 0.999 and L (vx + vy) > 0.999. Hence,
even if vx and vy are finite, we can consider the sign and the change in W
B−W S the same as those in TS −TB
if vx = vy ≥ 10/λ.
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5. Allowing Mixed Bundling
We finally extend our analysis to introduce the procurement strategy of mixed bundling (M),
where the buyer solicits prices both for individual products and for X and Y as a package.
The buyer has the option to buy neither product, only one product, or both of the products.
Let firm i′s bids for X, Y, and package XY be axi , a
y
i , and a
xy
i , respectively. The buyer selects
the outcome that maximizes her surplus from the alternatives:
max {0, vx −min{a
x
1 , a
x
2}, vy −min{a
y
1, a
y
2}, vx + vy −min{a
xy
1 , a
xy
2 , a
x
1 + a
y
2, a
y
1 + a
x
2}}
Lemma 3-5 characterize the equilibrium under mixed bundling for specific cost realizations.
We start with the case where it is efficient for one firm, say firm 1, to supply both products.
Lemma 3 Under cost realizations (cx1 , c
y
1) and (c
x
2 , c
y
2) , suppose that
cx1 ≤ min{vx, c
x
2} and c
y
1 ≤ min{vy, c
y
2}. (24)
Then the following strategies form an equilibrium:
aˆx1 = min{vx, c
x
2}, aˆ
y
1 = min{vy, c
y
2}, aˆ
xy
1 = min{vx, c
x
2}+min{vy, c
y
2};
aˆx2 = c
x
2 , aˆ
y
2 = c
y
2, aˆ
xy
2 = c
xy
2 ≡ c
x
2 + c
y
2,
with the buyer purchasing both products from firm 1 at a total price equal to
tˆ = aˆxy1 = min{vx, c
x
2}+min{vy, c
y
2},
and this is the unique equilibrium outcome of the game if the inequalities in (24) hold strictly.14
Proof. [Equilibrium.] Given the firms’ strategies, awarding the bundle to firm 1 maximizes
the buyer’s surplus and thus is the chosen contract outcome. Given firm 1’s strategy, firm 2
has no profitable unilateral deviation.
14When the inequalities in (24) do not hold strictly, if cx1 = vx < c
x
2 or c
y
1
= vy < c
y
2
, the equilibrium outcome
is exactly the same as that stated in Lemma 3. If cx1 = c
x
2 (or c
y
1
= cy
2
), firm 2 has an equal probability of
supplying X (or Y) at price min{vx, c
x
2} (or min{vy , c
y
2
}), but the total buyer price remains the same.
23
Given firm 2’s strategy, firm 1 chooses the strategy that maximizes its profit without being
undercut by firm 2 in the supply of either product or the bundle. Then, aˆx1 = min {vx, c
x
2} and
aˆy1 = min{vy, c
y
2} are respectively the maximal prices that firm 1 could receive for the supply
of product X and Y, and aˆxy1 = min{vx, c
x
2} + min{vy, c
y
2} is the maximal price that firm 1
could receive for supplying the bundle. Moreover, under aˆx1 , aˆ
y
1, and aˆ
xy
1 , firm 1 has the same
profit supplying the two products separately or as a package, and hence it cannot benefit from
a deviation that raises its bid for the package to supply the two products separately.
Therefore, the proposed is indeed an equilibrium. The outcome of this equilibrium is exactly
the same as that generated by separate purchase.
[Uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome.] By the standard logic for Bertrand competition,
the high-cost supplier, firm 2, must bid its cost in equilibrium: ak2 = c
k
2 for k = x, y, xy. Thus,
firm 2’s equilibrium strategy is uniquely determined. Since aˆk1 for k = x, y, xy is the optimal
response by firm 1 given firm 2’s strategy and the buyer’s purchase strategy, and since any
deviation by firm 1 that changes the bidding outcome will reduce its profit, the equilibrium
outcome is unique.15
The next lemma deals with the case where it is efficient for each firm to supply one different
good. Without loss of generality, suppose it is efficient for firm 1 to supply good X and firm 2
to supply good Y .
Lemma 4 Under cost realizations (cx1 , c
y
1) and (c
x
2 , c
y
2) , suppose that
cx1 ≤ min{vx, c
x
2} and c
y
2 ≤ min{vy, c
y
1}. (25)
The following strategies form an equilibrium under mixed bundling
aˆx1 = min{vx, c
x
2}, aˆ
y
1 = c
y
1, aˆ
xy
1 = min{vx, c
x
2}+min{vy, c
y
1};
aˆx2 = c
x
2 , aˆ
y
2 = min{vy, c
y
1}, aˆ
xy
2 = min{vx, c
x
2}+min{vy, c
y
1},
with firm 1 supplying X at price aˆx1 and firm 2 supplying Y at price aˆ
y
2. The total buyer price
15Firm 1’s equilibrium strategy is not unique. For instance, ax1 = min {v
x, cx2} , a
y
1
= min {vy, cy
2
} , axy
1
= aˆxy
1
+ε
for any ε > 0 will still be an equilibrium strategy, but this does not change the equilibrium outcome.
24
is
tˆ = aˆx1 + aˆ
y
2 = min{vx, c
x
2}+min{vy, c
y
1}.
This equilibrium generates the separate purchase outcome. When the inequalities in (25) hold
strictly, any other equilibrium outcome is Pareto dominated by the separate purchase outcome
for the firms.16
Proof. We proceed in three steps. Step 1, we show that the stated strategies indeed form an
equilibrium and the equilibrium generates the separate purchase outcome. Step 2, any possible
equilibrium where each firm supplies one product is Pareto dominated by the separate purchase
outcome for the firms. Step 3, any bundling equilibrium outcome is Pareto dominated by the
separate purchase outcome for the firms.
[Step 1.] Given the strategies of the firms, the buyer optimally picks firm 1 to supply X
and firm 2 to supply Y . Given firm 2’s strategy, it is optimal for firm 1 to bid aˆx1 , aˆ
y
1, and
aˆxy1 , resulting in winning the production of X. Similarly, given firm 1’s strategy, the proposed
strategy of firm 2 is also its best response. The firms’ equilibrium profits are pˆi1 = min {vx, c
x
2}−
cx1 and pˆi2 = min {vy, c
y
1} − c
2
2. The proposed equilibrium generates exactly the same outcome
as separate purchase.
[Step 2.] Any equilibrium where each firm supplies one product is Pareto dominated by the
separate purchase outcome for the firms. First note that an outcome where firm 1 supplies Y
and firm 2 supplies X cannot occur in equilibrium if the inequalities in (25) hold strictly so
that cx1 < c
x
2 and c
y
1 > c
y
2.
Suppose there is an alternative equilibrium where firm 1 supplies product X, firm 2 sup-
plies product Y and ax1 6= min{v
x, cx2}. Then a
x
1 < min{v
x, cx2} must hold because if a
x
1 >
min{vx, cx2}, the buyer either does not buy product X or procures product X from firm 2 and
in these cases firm 1 could lower its bid and wins product X for a profit. In the same logic,
for firm 2 to win product Y , ay2 ≤ min{vy, c
y
1} must hold. Thus, if such an alternative equilib-
rium indeed exists, the two firms’s profits must be such that p¯i1 < min{v
x, cx2} − c
x
1 = pˆi1 and
p¯i2 ≤ min{v
y, cy1} − c
y
2 = pˆi2. Thus such an equilibrium outcome is Pareto dominated by the
16If the inequalities in (25) do not hold strict, if cx1 < c
x
2 and c
y
2
< cy
1
, the equilibrium outcome remains the
same; if cx1 = c
x
2 ( or c
y
2
= cy
1
), it is equally possible that firm 2 supplies product X (or firm 1 supplies product
Y ), but the equilibrium buyer price remains the same as the separate purchase outcome.
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separate purchase outcome for the firms. The same holds true for an equilibrium where firm 1
supplies product X, firm 2 supplies product Y and ay2 6= min{v
y, cy1}.
[Step 3.] Finally, we show that for the firms, any bundling equilibrium outcome is Pareto
dominated by the equilibrium with separate purchase outcome.17 Suppose without loss of
generality that cxy1 ≤ c
xy
2 . Then, at the bundling equilibrium, we must have a
xy
1 ≤ a
xy
2 , firm 1
supplies the package with a profit p˜i1 = a
xy
1 − c
xy
1 and firm 2’s profit is p˜i2 = 0. Moreover, the
buyer’s surplus from the bundle must not be lower than that from purchasing the two goods
separately from firm 2 at cx2 and c
y
2, which implies
vx + vy − a
xy
1 ≥ max {vx − c
x
2 , 0}+ vy − c
y
2.
Thus, if vx ≥ c
x
2 , then vx + vy − a
xy
1 ≥ vx − c
x
2 + vy − c
y
1, or a
xy
1 ≤ c
x
2 + c
y
1, and hence
p˜i1 = a
xy
1 − c
xy
1 ≤ c
x
2 − c
x
1 = min {vx, c
x
2} − c
x
1 = pˆi1.
If vx < c
x
2 , then vx+ vy−a
xy
1 ≥ max {vx − c
x
2 , 0}+ vy− c
y
2 = vy− c
y
2 ≥ vy− c
y
1, or vx+ c
y
1 ≥ a
xy
1 ,
and hence
p˜i1 = a
xy
1 − c
x
1 − c
y
1 ≤ vx − c
x
1 = min {vx, c
x
2} − c
x
1 = pˆi1.
It follows that
p˜i1 + p˜i2 ≤ pˆi1 + pˆi2,
where the inequality holds strictly if pˆi2 = min {vy, c
y
1}− c
y
2 > 0. The next lemma deals with
the case where it is efficient to trade only one good. Without loss of generality, suppose it is
efficient for firm 1 to supply product X.
Lemma 5 Under cost realizations (cx1 , c
y
1) and (c
x
2 , c
y
2) , suppose that
cx1 ≤ min{vx, c
x
2} and vy < min{c
y
1, c
y
2}. (26)
17Suppose the inequalities in (25) hold and in addition vx ≥ max {c
x
1 , c
x
2} and vy ≥ max {c
y
1
, cy
2
} , a bundling
equilibrium indeed exists, with
a˜x1 = c
x
2 = a˜
x
2 ; a˜
y
1
= cy
1
= a˜y
2
; a˜xy
1
= max {cxy
1
, cxy
2
} = a˜xy
2
,
and the firm with the lower total cost for X and Y will supply both goods.
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Then the following strategies form an equilibrium
aˆx1 = min{vx, c
x
2}, aˆ
x
2 = c
x
2 ; aˆ
y
1 = max{c
y
1, c
y
2} = aˆ
y
2; aˆ
xy
1 = max{c
xy
1 , c
xy
2 } = aˆ
xy
2 ,
where firm 1 supplies product X at price min{vx, c
x
2}, and product Y is not purchased. This is
the unique equilibrium outcome if in addition cx1 < c
x
2 .
18
Proof. [Equilibrium.] First, given the strategies of the two firms, the contract outcome is
that the buyer only procures product X from firm 1. This is optimal for the buyer, because
it cannot obtain positive surplus by separately purchasing Y, and its surplus from purchasing
the bundle would be
vx + vy −max{c
xy
2 , c
xy
1 } ≤ vx + vy − c
xy
2 = vx − c
x
2 + vy − c
y
2 < vx − c
x
2 ,
lower than its surplus from purchasing X alone.
Next, obviously neither firm can benefit from unilaterally raising any of its bids, and neither
firm can benefit from unilaterally lowering its bid for X or for Y.
Finally, if max{cxy2 , c
xy
1 } > min{c
xy
2 , c
xy
1 }, we need to consider potential deviating bids for
the bundle by the firm with the lower total cost. If cxy2 < c
xy
1 , then in order for firm 2 to profit
from a deviation that enables it to supply the bundle, its bid axy2 must satisfy
vx + vy − a
xy
2 > vx −min{vx, c
x
2},
or
axy2 < vy +min{vx, c
x
2} = vy − c
y
2 +min{vx, c
x
2}+ c
y
2 < vy − c
y
2 + c
x
2 + c
y
2 < c
x
2 + c
y
2,
which is not profitable. On the other hand, if cxy1 < c
xy
2 , then in order for firm 1 to profit from
a deviation that enables it to supply the bundle, its bid axy1 must satisfy
vx + vy − a
xy
1 > vx −min{vx, c
x
2},
18If cx1 = c
x
2 , each firm has an equal probability of supply product X but the equilibrium price for the buyer
remains the same.
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or
axy1 < vy +min{vx, c
x
2} = vy − c
y
1 +min{vx, c
x
2}+ c
y
1,
or
axy1 − (c
x
1 + c
y
1) < vy − c
y
1 +min{vx, c
x
2} − c
x
1 < min{vx, c
x
2} − c
x
1 = aˆ
x
1 − c
x
1 ,
which is not profitable.
Thus, the proposed strategies indeed form an equilibrium. Its outcome is exactly the same
as that from separate purchase.
[Uniqueness of the Equilibrium Outcome.] Suppose cx1 < c
x
2 . Clearly, there can be no
other equilibrium in which only X is supplied, and there can be no equilibrium where only Y is
supplied. At a possible equilibrium where the bundle is supplied, it must be supplied by the firm
with the lower total cost for the two goods. Suppose cxy1 ≤ c
xy
2 . If there exists an equilibrium
with a bundling outcome, the winning bundle price must be axy1 = min{vx + vy, c
xy
2 }. Then,
firm 1’s profit from supplying the bundle is axy1 − c
xy
1 , whereas if it deviates to supplying X
alone at price min {vx, c
x
2}, its profit is min {vx, c
x
2} − c
x
1 . The deviation is acceptable to the
buyer because
vx + vy − a
xy
1 = vx + vy −min{vx + vy, c
xy
2 } ≤ vx − c
x
2 ≤ vx −min {vx, c
x
2} ,
and the deviation is profitable to firm 1 because
axy1 − c
xy
1 = min {vx + vy, c
x
2 + c
y
2} − c
x
1 − c
y
1 < min {vx, c
x
2}+ vy − c
x
1 − c
y
1
< min {vx, c
x
2} − c
x
1 .
Suppose next cxy1 > c
xy
2 , then at the possible equilibrium with bundled outcome, to prevent the
buyer from purchasing X alone from firm 1, we must have
vx + vy − a
xy
2 ≥ vx − c
x
1 ,
which can be true only if
vx + vy − c
xy
2 ≥ vx − c
x
1 ≥ 0,
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or
vy + c
x
1 ≥ c
x
2 + c
y
2,
which is not possible because vy < c
y
2 and c
x
1 < c
2
2.
Notice that Lemmas 3-5 continue to hold if the identities of the firms in (24)-(26) are
switched. Moreover, mixed bundling delivers the same equilibrium outcome as separate pur-
chase, unless the cost realizations (cx1 , c
y
1) and (c
x
2 , c
y
2) are such that it is efficient for each firm to
supply one different good, in which case there can be other equilibrium outcome under mixed
bundling, but Pareto dominated by the separate purchase outcome for the firms. Recall from
Theorem 1 that when vx, vy > µ2, buyer surplus is higher under pure bundling than under
separate purchase. Hence, when vx, vy > µ2, the expected procurement price is higher under
mixed bundling than under pure bundling if, in the presence of multiple equilibria, suppli-
ers choose to play their Pareto dominating equilibrium with separate purchase outcome. We
therefore arrive at the following conclusion.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium outcome under separate purchase is always an equilibrium
outcome under mixed bundling. Furthermore, if vx, vy > µ2, then the expected buyer surplus
is lower under mixed bundling than under pure bundling if, in the presence of multiple equilib-
ria, sellers choose to play the Pareto dominating equilibrium associated with separate purchase
outcome.
The desirability of mixed bundling is thus very different for a buyer engaged in procurement
and for a monopoly seller. In a typical model of bundled sales by a monopoly seller, making
the individual goods available together with the bundle gives the seller more options to extract
consumer surplus. The seller can often choose the prices for the individual goods and the
bundle in such a way that the profit under mixed bundling is higher than that under both
pure bundling and separate selling. For a buyer conducting procurement auctions, however,
the procurement prices are determined through competitive bidding by the sellers. When
sellers are invited to bid on the price for the two goods as a package, the option for them to
also bid on the prices of individual goods changes their strategic interactions, enabling them
to coordinate to higher bids for the bundle so that the equilibrium outcome becomes that of
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separate procurement. In particular, when the firms can also bid to supply individual products,
each firm has the incentive to raise its bid for the bundle because if he loses the bidding for the
bundle, he can still win the bidding for a single product, and this relaxes the competition for
the bundle. Mixed bundling can thus result in lower buyer surplus than pure bundling if the
latter generates higher expected buyer surplus than separate purchase, as when vx, vy ≥ µ2. In
fact, provided that firms will play the Pareto dominating equilibrium in the presence of multiple
equilibria, mixed bundling is strictly dominated by pure bundling whenever W S < WB.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper has derived several results on bundled procurement, in an environment where a
buyer procures multiple products from competing firms: (1) Pure bundling generates higher
buyer surplus than separate purchase, so long as trade for each good is sufficiently likely. (2) The
bundling advantage changes non-monotonically with product values, possibly first decreasing
and then increasing. It tends to be larger when costs for two goods are less dependent or
when the variance of each cost is higher. (3) Mixed bundling enables firms to coordinate to
higher prices and sustain the equilibrium outcome under separate purchase. Consequently,
pure bundling will dominate mixed bundling for the buyer when product values are high.
For convenience, we have developed our analysis in a model with two products and two
suppliers. But the numbers of products and of suppliers are not essential for the key idea
behind our results, namely that firms will compete more aggressively due to more symmetric
costs under bundling, and this competition effect dominates the potential adverse tying effect
when trade for each good is likely to be efficient. We thus expect that the basic insights from
our analysis will continue to be valid in settings with more products and firms.
There are other ways in which our model can be extended or modified. One of our important
assumptions is that the buyer has limited commitment ability, in the sense that it can commit
to one of the three procurement strategies considered, but not to a specific reserve price. It
could be interesting for future research to relax this assumption. Also, instead of assuming
that the buyer’s product valuations are publicly known, future research might also explore the
possibility that product values are realizations of random variables learned privately by the
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buyer.19
The buyer in our analysis has the market power to choose a procurement strategy that
maximizes her surplus. As one might expect, this market power can lead to distortions that
reduce total welfare. In fact, because the supplier for a good is sometimes not the lowest-
cost firm under pure bundling but will always be under separate purchase, pure bundling has
lower expected cost efficiency than separate purchase. Thus, the buyer’s optimal choice of
procurement is generally not socially optimal, in the sense that expected total welfare is lower
under pure bundling than under separate purchase.20
In practice, there are other factors that could influence the choice of procurement strategies,
such as (dis)economies of scope in production or in transaction. Controlling for these other
factors, our theory predicts that pure bundling is more likely to be selected as a procurement
strategy relative to separate purchase when: (i) the values of products are higher relative to
their possible costs, (ii) costs for different goods are more negatively dependent or less positively
dependent, and (iii) the cost dispersion of each good is higher. It would be interesting for future
research to empirically evaluate these predictions.
19Notice that our analysis covers the case where vx and vy are realizations of random variables learned privately
by the buyer but are known publicly to be above c¯.
20However, if product values were realizations of random variables and were the buyer’s private information,
then pure bundling could potentially have higher total welfare than separate purchase, possibly due to higher
expected total output associated with the lower total prices under bundling.
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